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The Meaning and Role of Duress in the 
Cooperation in Wrongdoing 
by 
Prof. Thomas Kopfensteiner 
The author is an associate professor of moral theology at Fordham 
University, New York, and a priest of the Archdiocese of St. Louis. This 
paper is the result of work done by the author for discussions sponsored by 
the Catholic Health Association and the NCCB's Secretariat for Pastoral 
Practices. 
When the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services were published by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 
new partnerships among health care organizations and providers were the 
focus of many Catholic sponsored health care systems. I Catholic and 
other-than-Catholic sponsored systems were in the process of forming 
partnerships based on a wide range of common principles and values. 
Partnerships were formed, for instance, with a focus on healthy 
communities, with a concern for the underserved and health care poor, or 
with a heightened sense of responsibility for the limited resources available 
for health care in the community. 
At another level, however, new relationships among health care 
providers often revealed divergent ethical commitments. Those 
commitments affect how medicine is practiced. This means that when there 
is a partnership forged between a Catholic and other-than-Catholic 
providers, the question of the Catholic partner's cooperation in any 
proscribed procedure needs to be addressed. In the Appendix to the 
Directives, the bishops detail the principles governing cooperation; these 
are meant to help guide the objective analysis of partnerships involving 
activities judged morally wrong by the Church. 
The purpose of this article is not to explain the various distinctions 
found in the principle of cooperation; nor is the purpose to review new 
partnerships between variously sponsored providers in order to show how 
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the principle has been effectively and legitimately applied.2 With the proper 
legal, managerial and financial structures, many new partnerships are 
relatively unproblematic examples of cooperation. The purpose of this 
article is twofold. First, the article analyzes with greater precision the 
meaning of duress and its role in the legitimate application of the principle. 
Second, the article illustrates how the element of duress can be a morally 
relevant factor when dealing with provisions for sterilization in some new 
partnerships. 3 
What the Directives Say 
As reflective of Catholic moral theology, the Directives are clear 
when they state that "direct sterilization of either men or women, whether 
permanent or temporary, is not permitted in a Catholic health care 
institution when its sole immediate effect is to prevent conception" 
(Directive 53). This prohibition is reflective of the kind of medicine that 
has always been practiced in Catholic institutions. The Directives, 
furthermore, make it clear that this absolute prohibition serves to protect 
the Church's understanding of human sexuality which holds that the 
unitive and procreative meanings of the conjugal act are inseparable. It is 
one of the positive aspects of the Directives to identify this kind of moral 
backing or rationale for individual proscriptions and prescriptions. 
The Directives continue, however, "procedures that induce sterility 
are permitted when their direct effect is the cure or alleviation of a present 
pathology and a simpler treatment is not available" (Directive 53). These 
latter cases are known as "indirect" sterilizations and are legitimate 
applications of the principle of double effect where a single act has two 
effects, one good and one bad. This traditional principle is also behind 
Directive 47, which concerns abortion and Directive 61, which concerns 
euthanasia and pain management. 
The principle of cooperation is another traditional principle that can 
be used when dealing with the issue of sterilization. It is the more relevant 
principle when sterilization is discussed in the context of new partnership 
among health care providers. The principle of cooperation differentiates 
"the action of the wrongdoer from the action of the cooperator through two 
major distinctions." The first major distinction is between formal and 
material cooperation. "If the cooperator intends the object of the 
wrongdoer's activity, then the cooperation is formal and, therefore, morally 
wrong. Since intention is not simply an explicit act of the will, formal 
cooperation can also be implicit. Implicit formal cooperation is attributed 
when, even though the cooperator denies intending the wrongdoer's object, 
no other explanation can distinguish the cooperator's object from the 
wrongdoer's object." Because the Directives are adopted as policy by every 
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Catholic health care service and institution, explicit formal cooperation is 
not really at issue; a further explanation of implicit formal cooperation, 
however, is needed to provide an objective appraisal of institutional 
partnerships. 
The distinction between explicit and implicit formal cooperation was 
well known in the neoscholastic manuals of moral theology.4 Attention was 
drawn to the distinction after a review of the November 1993 draft of the 
Directives by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Following the 
moral tradition, the Congregation underlined that "formal cooperation is 
verified not only when somebody cooperates from conscious approval of 
what a principal agent wrongly does, but also when the collaborating agent 
acts in a fashion directed to the achievement of the primary agent's goal." 
That is, one implicitly cooperates when "what the collaborating agent 
chooses to do is only properly intelligible as directed to achieving the end! 
purpose of the principal agent. One may so act without consciously 
approving; indeed one may do so while telling oneself one disapproves of 
what the principal agent is up to!"5 In other words, if the cooperator's 
action is unequivocally determined to contribute to the wrongdoing of 
another, then one's cooperation is implicitly forma\.6 Try as one may to 
describe it otherwise, the cooperator's action can have no other reasonable 
explanation than sharing in the wrongdoing. Nevertheless, a word of 
caution is in place. If each and every circumstance or even the knowledge 
that wrongdoing will occur is exaggerated, then all distinctions between 
material and formal cooperation would collapse. 
The second major distinction of the principle excludes intention and, 
instead, deals with the object of the action. It is expressed by immediate 
and mediate material cooperation. "Material cooperation is immediate 
when the object of the cooperator is the same as the object of the 
wrongdoer." A traditional example from medical ethics is the doctor who 
performs a proscribed procedure; another example of immediate material 
cooperation would be when a sterilization procedure is performed at a 
Catholic health care institution. The bishops state that "immediate material 
cooperation is wrong, except in some instances of duress." The bishops, 
however, did not detail what they mean by duress. 
The Element of Duress 
Dealing with sterilizations on the basis of the principle of cooperation 
highlights an important dissimilarity to earlier discussions on sterilization. 
The principle of cooperation will require that there be institutional or social 
factors that go beyond any medical indications for a sterilization to be 
performed. "The reason for the cooperation must be something over and 
beyond the sterilization itself."7 Medical indications are a necessary but not 
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sufficient criteria for cooperating in a sterilization at a Catholic health care 
facility. To perform a sterilization for medical indications alone cannot be 
justified by Catholic moral theology. Earlier attempts to justify a 
sterilization on the basis of the principle of totality do not meet the more 
stringent evidentiary threshold demanded by the principle of cooperation. 
That is, invoking the principle of totality to justify sterilization procedures 
for medical indications fails to account for the legitimate ways of avoiding 
pregnancy that are available to the patient. 8 
Invoking the element of duress, then, will be based on the presence 
of outside factors that have so diminished or compromised the autonomy 
of the Catholic facility that greater and irreparable harm is risked if the 
facility refuses to cooperate. "Material cooperation will be justified only 
where the hospital because of duress or pressure cannot reasonably 
exercise the autonomy is has (i.e., when it will do more harm than good) ... . 
The allowance of material cooperation in extraordinary cases is based on 
dangers of an even more serious evil. ... " 9 
Putting aside the still evolving environment of today's health care, 
there is an undeniable ambiguity inherent in any assessment of duress as it 
is a factor in material cooperation. When assessing the level of duress 
present in a situation, we must balance the real and feasible options 
available to distance ourselves from the wrongdoing against the likelihood 
of greater and irreparable harm occurring. Do we have alternatives that 
would distinguish our action more clearly from the wrongdoer's so that our 
cooperation would be only mediately material? Are predictions of greater 
harm occurring unwarranted or does a deliberate analysis show that the 
dangers are real and likely to occur? Clearly, there is the need for a 
strategic weighing that takes into account not only the short term but also 
the long term effects of our decisions. To guide the assessment of duress as 
a morally relevant factor in our reasoning, perhaps an axiom can be formed: 
the more likely it is that greater harm will occur, the more likely it is that 
duress will be a factor in our application of the principle; and, the more 
alternatives that we have to distance ourselves from the wrongdoing, the 
less likely it is that duress will be a factor in our application of the principle. 
To be sure, we cannot exaggerate what constitutes duress and that 
may be a particular temptation when we see how many new partnerships 
continue to be formed by health care providers. If we exaggerate the 
element of duress, however, we risk cooperating in an implicit formal way. 
According to the Directives, duress distinguishes immediate material 
cooperation from implicit formal cooperation. "Immediate material 
cooperation - without duress - is equivalent to implicit formal cooperation 
and, therefore, is morally wrong." In other words, if a new partnership is 
formed where there is an exaggerated understanding of duress or where 
any proscribed procedure is not sufficiently distinct from the Catholic 
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partner in terms of governance, management, performance and financial 
benefit, the Catholic partner cooperates in an implicit formal way.IO That is, 
despite efforts to do otherwise, the only legitimate explanation of the 
institution's action is a direct participation in the wrongdoing. 
Case of Duress 
The element of duress has always been a morally relevant factor in 
the application of the principle of cooperation. This, too, is evidenced in 
the neoscholastic manuals of moral theology. II The paradigm case was 
helping the thief rob the bank in order to avoid the loss of life; the more 
fundamental good of life was weighed against the good of private property. 
As a factor in the application of the principle of cooperation, however, the 
element of duress was not limited to the area of justice nor was duress a 
relevant factor only when human life was the good to be protected. 12 For 
example, when dealing with legitimate applications of the principle of 
cooperation, the manuals spoke of a woman's participation in onanistic 
intercourse in order to avoid the greater harm of adultery; or giving a liquor 
to a drunkard in order to prevent a brawl; or a person in need asking for a 
Sacrament from a priest who is unworthy and will sin by conferring it. In 
each of these cases, the legitimacy of such a strictly circumscribed 
application of the principle of cooperation was found in the manual's 
determination that the person's cooperation in the wrongdoing was in order 
to prevent harms that could not be repaired or to protect goods that could 
not otherwise be preserved. 
The question, then, is whether there are situations when duress can 
be a morally relevant factor when considering the institutional cooperation 
of a Catholic health care facility in sterilization? Are there factors above 
and beyond any medical indication for a sterilization that limit the 
autonomy of the Catholic health care facility and threaten to bring about 
greater and irreparable harm, such as the closing of the facility or of an 
obstetrics unit which, traditionally, handled high risk pregnancies in a way 
that was consistent with Catholic moral teaching? For instance, in the 
context of managed care - where providers must contract with third party 
payers to provide a continuum of health care services and where payers 
limit the providers to which their members have access - the presence of 
a Catholic facility could be jeopardized by its not being able to contract 
with third party payers because it offers an insufficient range of services. 
When a health care payer must decide between two institutions to provide 
health care services to its members, it would seem reasonable to assume 
that the area's population would prefer the provider who, while excluding 
abortion services, offered the broadest range of services, particularly in the 
area of gynecology and obstetrics. How would the loss of a facility or its 
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obstetrics umt Impact not only the health of the community but the 
Church's mission and influence in that community, perhaps one in which 
there is a minority Catholic population and no other institutional Church 
presence? 
These questions do not have ready answers but require sober and 
deliberate analysis on the part of health care and Church leaders. When that 
analysis is guided by the principle of cooperation, it will account not only 
for the evil that is done, but also for the good that is achieved. Is the good 
valued highly enough or is there a sufficient sense of urgency to protect it 
to outweigh the evil caused by our cooperation?13 Since that evil cannot be 
abolished completely, we aim to contain and limit it as much as possible. 
Surely, the closer we are to the evil, the more serious a reason we must 
have to cooperate; and when duress is a morally relevant factor, that reason 
is not any reason, but it is that we have no feasible alternatives to prevent 
greater and irreparable harm occurring. 14 
Again, the issue here is not elective or voluntary sterilizations; if 
those are performed, they would be clearly separate from the services 
provided by a Catholic health care institution. The issue, rather, is the 
performance of a sterilization under duress; that is, in a situation where the 
Catholic facility has a diminished autonomy due to constrictions imposed 
by factors that are above and beyond any medical indications for the 
sterilization, and that threaten to bring about greater harm. Do we risk 
bringing about greater and irreparable harm by losing a presence in health 
care if we refuse to cooperate in a sterilization during, for instance, a 
Cesarean section delivery or other abdominal surgery? If greater and 
irreparable harm is calculable in such strictly circumscribed situations, we 
could resolve the dilemma by having recourse to the principle of 
cooperation. 
The Issue of Scandal 
A prudential application of the principle of cooperation will also 
consider the possibility of cooperation leading to scandal. Scandal has 
been traditionally defined as leading another into sin. 15 Scandal is of such 
importance in the application of the principle that cooperation, which in all 
other respects is morally appropriate, may be refused because of the 
scandal that would be caused in the circumstances (Directive 70). Keeping 
the issue of scandal in mind will ensure that institutional survival does not 
depend upon sacrificing Catholic identity by wholesale accommodation or 
by diluting any sense of wrongdoing. Yet, at the same time, the ambiguity 
often caused by partnering with others must not be exaggerated to preclude 
legitimate forms of cooperation. The bishops rightly encourage "an 
increased collaboration among Catholic-sponsored health care institutions" 
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but, by all means, we should resist the temptation to fall into a ghetto-like 
mentality in Catholic health care. 
Many new partnerships present a two-edged sword so that the 
context in which scandal must be determined can be ambiguous. As the 
bishops observe, "new partnerships can be viewed as opportunities for 
Catholic health care institutions and services to witness to their religious 
and ethical commitments ... New partnerships can help implement the 
Church's social teaching." Yet, at the same time, "new partnerships can 
pose serious challenges to the viability of the identity of Catholic health 
care institutions and services, and their ability to implement these 
Directives in a consistent way ... " While this ambiguity is present when 
partnerships are formed with those who do not share Catholic moral 
convictions, "the danger of creating misunderstanding must be carefully 
avoided with the help of suitable explanation of what is going on."16 
In addition, the assessment of the possibility of scandal requires a 
nuanced consideration of the evil that may be involved in our cooperation. 
For instance, to help in the determination of scandal, a distinction can be 
made in terms of the gravity of the evil involved. Abortion and assisted 
suicide are, for example, graver evils than reproductive technologies or, in 
this case, sterilization. To attack and destroy human life is a graver evil than 
bringing life about or suppressing the reproductive function. In light of the 
distinction about the gravity of the matter, perhaps another axiom can be 
formed to help guide a prudential assessment of the possibility of scandal: 
the graver the evil, the higher the risk of scandal; and the higher the risk of 
scandal, the more distant the Catholic partner must be from the 
wrongdoing. 
Conclusion 
The moral tradition presented the principle of cooperation in the 
language of wrongdoing. For a more positive understanding of the 
principle, this grammar of wrongdoing needs to be completed by a 
grammar of responsibility. This is particularly true when a public good like 
health care is at stake. A grammar of responsibility does not lessen the need 
for a careful scrutiny and an exact analysis of wrongdoing, but rather 
completes it by focusing on the shared sense of the good life to be held in 
common with all members of the community. A grammar of responsibility 
would provide a broader and more adequate context in which to weigh the 
goods and evils involved in any application of the principle, especially 
though when the element of duress is a morally relevant factor in our 
deliberations. Focusing on our responsibility to work with others is not 
meant to compromise our moral integrity or water down our moral 
teaching. The grammar of responsibility, rather, provides the proper 
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perspective in which to consider the long term effects of our decisions, to 
calculate the harms that we might bring about, and to realize the 
importance of the goods that are threatened to be lost. 
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